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Introduction [1]
New landscapes and new challenges are beginning to emerge on the strategic horizon. Traditional risks continue to
pose relatively familiar political, economic, diplomatic and military challenges –for Europe in general and for Spain in
particular–  in  several  parts of  the world.  However, the  past  few years have witnessed the  emergence of new
phenomena with a significant potential to pose strategic challenges in the international arena.
In  the  early  1990s,  a  new  strategic  environment,  defined  by  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  collapse  of
communism, quickly took shape. Democratic and market transition, economic development and an end to poverty,
along with the general spread of prosperity and peace were not only hopes but real concrete opportunities generated
by this new strategic landscape. With time, however, we have seen how the ‘end of history’ –longed for by some–
continues to elude us. As the 20th century came to a close, the so-called ‘clash of civilisations’ and the emergence of
international  terrorism (particularly that perpetrated by radical  Islamic groups), along with the spectre of failed
states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conspired to dominate the strategic outlook for the
following years, as the world experienced a spate of major terrorist attacks, large-scale military intervention in
Afghanistan and Iraq and, now, the Iranian nuclear crisis and the related outburst of the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict in
the Lebanon.
Nevertheless, it  would now appear that the very global  backdrop against which these more traditional  strategic
threats developed is itself rising up in rebellion, provoking a wave of newer, less conventional strategic challenges to
which  we have scarcely  managed to react. New risks unleashed by ‘Mother  Nature’, such  as natural  disasters,
pandemics and climate change –the reach and impacts of which are intensifying as a result of ongoing globalisation,
demographic growth  and urbanisation– are some of the new phenomena which  have recently  emerged on  the
strategic  horizon.  Yet  ‘human’  risks  also  continue  to  proliferate  in  new  variant  forms.  The  possibility  of  a
destabilising abuse of cyberspace now poses challenges that were unthinkable only a few years ago. And, last but
not least, the energy foundation of our local and global economies has become the new universal leitmotiv threading
together nearly all of our political and economic challenges.
On the other hand, in recent years the benign, even robust, evolution of the international economy has continued to
blow a cool breeze across this smouldering strategic landscape, facilitating the resolution of many of these problems
while mitigating the impacts and potential dangers of others. For now, at least, the international economy continues
to run smoothly, providing a comforting balm to nervous or resentful actors upon the strategic landscape. But the
good times could be coming to an end.
Our aim here is to identify and reflect upon these newer, less traditional, strategic challenges, along with other more
well-known conventional threats that are now in urgent need to be addressed afresh, given recent transformations
in the strategic environment. It is essential to examine these new strategic challenges at length, posing important
questions as to when and how Spain, Europe and the international community will respond to them.
Mother Nature: A Strategic Risk?
When discussing societal threats, natural  disasters and biological risks are usually mentioned along with national
and international terrorism. However, ever since the attacks of 11 September 2001, much more world attention has
been given to terrorism than to natural  disasters and biological  threats when evaluating strategic outlooks and
designing common actions and strategies. After  all, we are committed to a more or  less coordinated war  effort
against international terrorism, whereas the threats posed by Mother Nature are almost always dealt with in an
improvised manner, with the approach focused more on reconstruction than on foresight and prevention.
Nonetheless, there are many signs that the time has come to begin to treat Mother Nature as a strategic risk whose
ability to destabilise conditions required for  peace and prosperous coexistence between countries and peoples is
similar to –or even greater than– that of terrorism today.
There are three main reasons why natural disasters are becoming more imminent and much more serious strategic
risks than in the past: (1) globalisation; (2) demographic development; and (3) climate change.
The New Wave of Globalisation: Magnifying the Spread of Infectious Diseases
New technologies are giving rise to a new wave of globalisation in which billions of people travel  regularly and
frequently, both as tourists and as business agents.[2] The present-day globetrotter covers larger distances and does
so much more quickly than in any other period in human history. At the same time, larger volumes of goods are
transported longer distances and in much shorter time-frames than ever before. Interaction and human exchange
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scarcely know any limits in our present modern society. However, these positive features also pose a threat with
respect to the spread of infectious diseases.
Nonetheless,  the  problem of  the  new wave  of  globalisation  is  not  growing  interconnectivity  in  itself,  as  this
phenomenon has existed for centuries, but rather  the much shorter time-frame required for humans to make a
global connection. Until fairly recently an intercontinental voyage took weeks. Today it is possible to travel to any
major international destination in less than 24 hours. To give an example, the Madrid-Barajas airport provides direct
connections to 105 airports; with just one transfer it has connections to 1,100 and with two transfers it is possible to
travel to over 2,500 national and international airports.
Graph 1. Tourism, International Arrives Worldwide, 1990-2020
Source: World Tourism Organization, 2005.
Another  problem is volume  of  air  travel.  Madrid-Barajas is the  fifth-largest  airport  in  Europe, with  35  million
passengers passing through it in 2003. International tourism accounts for a significant percentage of air passenger
traffic and is growing almost exponentially. Some 265 million people arrived in Europe in 1990, 416 million in 2004
and the expected figure for 2020 is 717 million. After France, Spain is the country that receives the highest number
of tourists in the world. Fifty million people arrived in Spain in 2004, and over 4.5 million Spaniards visited other
countries that year.
Graph 2. Tourism, International Arrivals, Spain, 1995-2004
Source: World Tourism Organization, 2005.
The drastic reduction in the amount of time needed to make a physical connection anywhere in the world and the
spectacular growth in the volume of passenger traffic multiply the likelihood of a new disease becoming a pandemic.
For example, SARS would probably never have spread beyond rural China without the current air transport network.
The outbreak of SARS in 2003 extended from Hong Kong to North America and Europe, claiming a considerable
number of victims within only a fortnight. The SARS epidemic and the manner in which it spread throughout the
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world are a warning sign of one of the disadvantages of the globalisation process currently under way. Similarly,
considering that the new wave of globalisation has scarcely begun –and that the volume of passenger traffic is likely
to increase even more while travel times will continue to shorten– there is little doubt that globalisation provides an
excellent infrastructure for the spread of infectious diseases.
To illustrate the problem, imagine that a disease suddenly emerges that would spread with the same ease as, say,
chicken pox (varicella). Chicken pox is a cosmopolitan and highly contagious disease. It is transmitted by direct
contact with an infected person’s blisters and by inhaling respiratory secretions containing the virus. The period of
contagion lasts from one or two days before the rash breaks out until a crust forms on the blisters. Because the virus
is so contagious, just one person could easily transmit the disease to all the passengers of an aircraft without the
carrier or anyone else realising. Bearing in mind that the carrier must first check in at the airport, which is also a
source of risk given the large volume of travellers, the virus could be spread throughout nearly the entire world in
less than 24 hours.
There is currently a major concern that the influenza virus known as H5N1 –or more popularly as bird flu– most
likely  displays all  of  these aforementioned characteristics. Like chicken pox, this flu  is highly contagious and is
transmitted through droplets in the air, although, unlike chicken pox, its mortality rate can be very high, given the
type of influenza in question.
As its popular name indicates, the H5N1 virus currently affects mainly fowl and so far has only been transmitted to
humans through intense contact with infected birds.  Nevertheless, the virus has been present in Asia for quite some
time. Several alerts were raised during 2005 and at the beginning of 2006 concerning the possible spread of bird flu,
which by then had reached certain European countries like Russia, Greece and Turkey (killing four of the 12 people
infected in the latter). While the seriousness of this development should not be not be exaggerated, nor should it be
taken too lightly. Bird flu continues to be a disease that only spreads easily among fowl, although the number of
cases of transmission from birds to humans is growing, and the disease has a very high mortality rate in such cases,
particularly among young people. According to the WHO, between 2003 and early 2006 there were 161 known cases
of humans contracting the disease after having had contact with infected birds; more than half (86) died. Thus far
there is no indication that the virus has mutated in such a way so as to be transmitted from person to person.
Nevertheless, as the number of cases of transmission of the virus from birds to humans continues to mount, so too
does the likelihood that one day the virus will become transmissible between humans.
This is not the first time that a virus initially affecting mainly birds has ultimately proven dangerous to humans. The
most recent pandemics of 1957 and 1968 were triggered by an exchange of genes between an avian and a human
influenza virus. The same was true of the 1918 pandemic. However, there is a significant difference between the
1918 pandemic and those of 1957 and 1968. According to many experts, the 1918 flu virus began by only affecting
birds; however, following a series of mutations, the virus began to spread effectively to –and between– humans,
although the 1918 bird flu did not exchange any genes with a human virus. While the possibility does exist that
H5N1 could exchange genes with a human influenza virus and, accordingly, acquire the ability to transmit itself
between humans, so far H5N1 has followed the same trajectory as the virus responsible for the 1918 pandemic.
There are still other similarities with the1918 episode. These include the severity of the illness and its high mortality
rate; H5N1’s tendency to affect young, healthy people; along with the incidence of primary viral pneumonia and the
absence of  secondary bacterial  infection. Although the high mortality  rate of  the virus would probably drop off
somewhat if  it  became transmissible between human beings, the fact that the subtype H5 has never  circulated
among humans indicates that the population would be universally vulnerable to a mutated H5N1.
Should H5N1 acquire the capacity to spread among humans, two possible scenarios –one mild and another more
severe– would present themselves. In the first scenario, the mortality rate would remain low and the population
most at risk would be the two extremes of the human life cycle: the youngest and the oldest. The WHO estimates
that worldwide deaths caused by such a pandemic could reach up to between seven and eight million more than in a
normal  year. Even so, a very large number of people –hundreds of millions– would fall  ill. In the more severe
scenario, however, the outlook would be much more grim. Taking the 1918 pandemic as a reference, we know that
between 25% and 30% of the world’s population became infected with the flue virus during 1918 and 1919, while
between 40 and 100 million people died as a direct consequence of the disease. Bearing in mind that, at the time,
world population was only some 1.8 billion, nearly 540 million people became ill and between 2% and 5% of the
world’s population died in approximately one year. Using the date from the 1918 epidemic as a base reference for a
severe scenario today, some 1.8 billion people could fall ill  and between 126 and 315 million might die, most of
whom would be healthy young people.
What would be the consequences for society of such a pandemic? Although the number of deaths in the severe
scenario is chilling, the principal societal problem would be medical care, given that the number of people who would
likely contract the disease would be very high, regardless of whether the pandemic would only mild or much more
severe. Because there has never previously existed an international  infrastructure sufficient to allow a virus to
spread among a ‘virgin population’ worldwide in less than 24 hours, it would now be reasonable to expect that the
first outbreak of such a pandemic could occur simultaneously all around the world. The consequences, as we can
imagine, could be devastating. Within  a matter  of  days, hundreds of millions of people would have caught  the
disease, provoking a widespread, simultaneous collapse of the healthcare services in all affected countries. Simply
visiting a hospital  could pose a severe risk of exposure to the virus. Because no vaccines or effective treatment
exists for the H5NI virus, entire societies would probably enter a state of shock and, in all likelihood, panic.
Our security forces would have to be prepared to maintain a minimum of order. The problem is that any and all
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institutions would be affected by the disease. Both the armed forces and law enforcement agencies would themselves
risk losses of some 2% to 5%, to say nothing of a very high percentage –perhaps as much as 25% to 30%– of sick
and convalescent. This would mean that security forces would have to perform their duties in highly unfavourable
conditions. Even their capacity to effectively execute their tasks might be brought into question. Furthermore, when
attempting to maintain order in an ailing, disintegrating society, the army and security forces would be exposed to
an even greater risk of contracting the disease.
The keys for coping with a potential pandemic are precaution, time and preparation. As for precaution, a pandemic
makes  society  extremely  vulnerable  and,  as  such,  poses  a  significant  security  risk.  Therefore,  any  measures
designed to prevent the H5N1 virus from mutating represent a valuable investment in a society’s security. The WHO
has already  designed a strategy for  tackling this issue. In  the event the  disease should become a reality, the
important thing would be to stem its spread as much as possible at the site of outbreak, as this would increase the
possibilities of developing a vaccine and suitable medication for keeping the disease in check. However, in the case
of Spain –one of the most visited countries in the world– this would be particularly difficult. The necessary measures
might appear very drastic to some, but we must be prepared to isolate an entire country from external contact and
to minimise contact between people within that country if we are to achieve the desired result. Even then, success
would not be guaranteed. Finally, if our precautions against (and our attempts to stem the spread of) the disease
fail, we would need to be prepared for the worst. What will be the action plan of our military and security forces in
the not entirely unlikely case that the country were to be struck by a new illness resulting in a shockingly high
number of sick and dead in a matter of only days –a situation that could very likely unleash chaos across society?–.
Demographic Growth: A Magnifier of Natural Disasters
Demographic growth involves two main processes. On the one hand, there is the overall  growth of the world’s
population, which will continue to be very significant throughout the 21st century. On the other hand, there is the
process of urbanisation, now taking place at a feverish pace in most of the less-developed world. Both processes,
however, contribute to an increase in population density, particularly in metropolitan areas.
How does demographic growth affect the analysis of the strategic risks posed by Mother Nature? There are two main
concerns. First, one may deduce that areas with high population densities are more vulnerable to natural disasters
like earthquakes, flooding or tropical storms. What is more, coastal areas are undoubtedly much more vulnerable to
natural disasters than inland zones. Nevertheless, much of the urbanisation now taking place in developing countries
is concentrated precisely along coastal areas. In Southeast Asia, for example, 65% of cities with over 2.5 million
inhabitants are located in coastal areas. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 57 of the 77 largest cities are coastal.
Over one-third of the world’s population currently lives less than 62 kilometres from the seacoast and 13 of the 20
largest cities in the world are situated on the sea.
In view of future demographic trends and the continued development of coastal zones, it is foreseeable that the
potential  damage, both material  and human, caused by an extreme meteorological  phenomenon will  continue to
increase into the future, even should the incidence of such phenomena remains constant.
Graph 3. Evolution of Urbanisation, 1950-2030
Source: UN, World Population Prospects, 2004.
The recent hurricane Katrina, which submerged 80% of New Orleans and claimed over 1,300 lives, illustrates the
difficulties that even one of the richest countries in the world faces in preventing and alleviating a disaster in the
making. If Katrina’s trajectory had been different and, instead of affecting a rich country with a large population, it
had struck a poor country with a high population density in the area in question, the material and human damage
would have been much greater. In 1998, hurricane Mitch killed 9,000 people in Central America and caused material
and infrastructure damage that  has still  not  been  fully  repaired, while  in  1991 the tropical  cyclone  Gorky left
138,000 dead in  Bangladesh. More recently, the Indian Ocean tsunami at Christmas 2004 swept over  the very
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densely populated countries of the region, killing nearly 300,000 people. In 2005 an earthquake claimed 80,000
lives in Pakistan, another country with a high population density.
Natural disasters of this kind are not only tragedies for those affected; they also require the effort of the armed
forces and the police to guarantee order in the region in question and sometimes across the entire country. From a
military viewpoint, Katrina was a huge challenge for the US armed and security forces. On September 7, 2005, the
US posted a contingent of 63,000 military personnel to the area affected by the hurricane. Of these, 25,000 were
assigned to New Orleans. A large number of police from all over the country also assisted with rescue and security
tasks. Pakistan deployed between 70,000 and 80,000 troops following the 2005 earthquake. Natural disasters also
often require unforeseen international participation. In the case of Pakistan, Spain sent a contingent of 370 military
personnel. The fact that demographic trends increase our vulnerability to natural disasters means that the armed
forces should be prepared for more intense requirements for troop deployment in order to cope with strategic risks
of this type in the near future.
Graph 4. Evolution of Population Density, 1950-2050
Source: UN, World Population Prospects, 2004.
The  second concern  related  to  demographic  growth  is  biological.  While  globalisation  is  an  effective  means  of
increasing the  speed of  contact  between people located considerable  distances apart, demographic growth, and
above all urbanisation, are very effective means of promoting opportunities for contact within a particular limited
area. Both globalisation and demographic growth (particularly urbanisation) contribute to the potentially more rapid
spread of diseases old and new.  It therefore does not surprise us that the origins of our most recent pandemics have
been in Asia.
Urbanisation and demographic growth more generally have led to a genuine population explosion in the world’s
cities. When the last major pandemic occurred in 1918, the ten largest cities in the world had smaller populations
than Tokyo in 2005. Furthermore, many of the 21st-century megalopolises are located in parts of the world with a
high rate of seismic activity, in tropical zones, and y in coastal regions. The significant concentration of population in
the megalopolises makes them extremely vulnerable to any epidemic, and increases the likelihood of there being a
sufficient number of infected people to make a pandemic possible.
Table 1. The Ten-Largest Cities in the World, Millions of Inhabitants, 1900-2015
Position 1900 1950 2005 2015
1 London 6.4 New York 12.3 Tokyo 35.3 Tokyo 36.2
2 New York 4.2 Tokyo 11.2 Mexico DF 19.0 Mumbai 22.6
3 Paris 3.3 London 8.3 New York 18.5 Delhi 20.9
4 Berlin 2.7 Paris 5.4 Mumbai 18.3 Mexico DF 20.6
5 Chicago 1.7 Moscow 5.3 Sao Paulo 18.3 Sao Paulo 19.9
6 Vienna 1.7 Shanghai 5.3 Delhi 15.3 New York 19.7
7 Tokyo 1.5 Rhein-Ruhr 5.3 Calcutta 14.3 Dhaka 17.9
8 St Petersburg 1.4 Buenos Aires 5.0 Buenos Aires 13.3 Jakarta 17.4
9 Manchester 1.4 Chicago 5.0 Jakarta 13.2 Lagos 17.0
10 Philadelphia 1.4 Calcutta 4.4 Shanghai 12.6 Calcutta 16.8
Source: ONU, World Population Prospects, 2004.
Climate Change: The Magnifier of Magnifiers
Lastly, when analysing the strategic risks posed by Mother Nature, we should not overlook the climate changes that
have been observed over the last half century. The complexity of this phenomenon requires an analysis that goes
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beyond  the  limitations  of  this  paper  and  therefore  prevents  us  from  exploring  this  problem  in  full  detail.
Nevertheless, this analysis aims to stress the potential strategic problems that climate change may imply.
It is generally agreed that current climate changes are partly the result of human activity. However, there is less
consensus as to the extent of this human influence and the exact nature of its impact. That is say, there is still a
certain amount of disagreement over how much of today’s climate changes can be explained by human activity and
how much can be attributed to cyclical climatic factors unrelated to human intervention. Nonetheless, there is a
body of evidence to back the argument that global warming is the result of the emission of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases stemming from human activities such as industrial processes, fossil-fuel combustion and changing
land use (for example, deforestation).
The purpose of this section, however, is not to evaluate whether climate changes are due to a greater or lesser
extent  to human activity. Such an analysis is largely the task of others. It  is also the job of  others to design
appropriate countermeasures should human activity indeed be determined to be decisive to climate change. From a
short- and medium-term strategic point of view, however, it is sufficient to conclude that climate change has been
and is continuing to occur, implying a number of consequences that require advance strategic planning in order to
face up to the challenges posed by Mother Nature.
Current projections point to a temperature rise of between 1.4ºC and 5.8ºC (depending on the region) for the year
2100. Nevertheless, meteorological changes related to the increase in global temperatures and a range of human
activities are already being witnessed. For example, global  warming has caused a higher incidence of periods of
extreme temperatures. Apart from more heat or cold waves, global warming also entails a greater incidence and
intensity of rainfall, and a very significant rise in the sea level. Similarly, there is a grounded and legitimate concern
than the heating of the planet  may change regional  climate patterns, with extreme meteorological  phenomena
spreading geographically; indeed, some experts even predict that such extreme weather phenomena will become
typical and will no longer be considered unusual.
Given the correlation between high sea temperatures and the formation of hurricanes, it has been speculated that
the frequency of hurricanes will increase in a hotter world. It may be argued against this notion that there is no
evidence to demonstrate that the frequency of hurricanes has risen over the long term, with temperature increases.
However, because the temperature of the sea’s surface has a decisive influence on the intensity of a tropical storm
(i.e., the higher the temperature, the greater the intensity), experts reckon that global warming is responsible for
the increased intensity of hurricanes witnessed over the past years. The hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005 were
unprecedented in their intensity. The economic damage and the number of people affected by hurricanes have also
shot up in recent years. It should be stressed that the rise in sea surface temperature could also influence the path
of hurricanes, making them more likely to reach, for example, the North American coast than in the past. Nor can
we rule out the possibility of hurricanes and tropical storms erupting in places that have so far been immune to such
phenomena. Since demographic growth magnifies the impact of natural disasters, all that remains to be concluded is
that if  the frequency and intensity  of  natural  disasters are increasing due to climate change, this adds further
complications to an already complex outlook with natural disasters playing an increasingly destabilising role in the
world.
Extreme weather conditions are not the only worrying factor when the effects of climate change are analysed. It is
very likely that the environmental impact of global warming will disrupt the ecosystem of the entire planet in ways
that are currently still impossible to anticipate. Many expect biodiversity to diminish as rising, extreme temperatures
become noticeable. The direct consequence of such a change will be the extinction of certain species. However, what
is bad for some is often good for others. Certain existing species could benefit from, even thrive on such changes.
Nor can we rule out the possibility that new life forms might appear. What is more, there will be an imminent risk of
current  infectious diseases broadening their  geographical  scope  of  transmission.  Diseases such  as malaria  and
dengue fever might spread more extensively. Once such changes take place within the ecosystem, a chain reaction
can be expected to occur, possibly leading to modifications in the laws regulating the appearance and development
of viruses. That is to say, that while it is not entirely clear that environmental changes will  make humans more
vulnerable to infectious diseases, it is highly likely to be the case.
In other words, when assessing the possible impact of climate change, we may conclude that: (1) it is highly likely
that natural  disasters –such as tropical  storms, hurricanes, flooding, droughts and heat/cold waves– will  become
more frequent, more geographically widespread and, above all, more intense as a result of climate change; (2) it is
highly likely that infectious diseases such as malaria and dengue fever  will  broaden their geographical  scope of
transmission as a result of climate change; and (3) as climate change becomes more evident, it is likely that major
alterations will take place in the planet’s biodiversity, possibly triggering new, unknown threats to human health.
In general  terms, climate change could be described as a huge and continuous natural  disaster  whose impacts
amplify what we might call the ‘normal’ biological or meteorological damage provoked by natural disasters, making
such disasters more frequent as well. A magnifier of the magnifiers of natural disasters is gradually emerging on the
strategic horizon. Paradoxically, the pace of climate change is also quickening, thanks largely to globalisation and
demographic growth. In strategic terms, this means that natural disasters are already capable of disturbing social
order, the rule of law, etc., and that they should accordingly be regarded as a risk that requires some sort  of
mobilisation of a country’s security forces. Therefore, the time has come to think about reinforcing strategies, if they
indeed exist, for dealing with these types of risks in the future.
Strategic Risks of Cyberspace[3]
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New technologies, particularly the Internet, have modified patterns of communication and consumption behaviour.
These changes are largely beneficial to society. But we should not ignore the fact that new technologies also provide
criminals and terrorist groups with very powerful tools.
In a sense, the Internet has become a Trojan horse for Jihadist terrorism in the West, enabling its protagonists to
magnify the impact of their actions worldwide. This new tool  has substantially altered the behaviour  of terrorist
organisations, giving rise to what has been dubbed ‘post-modern terrorism’. This section analyses some of the more
immediate implications stemming from the use of the Internet by international Jihadism.
First, cyberspace has enabled terrorist  groups to become independent from the conventional  media’s traditional
propaganda tools. For example, whereas the television channel al-Jazeera was the major revelation of the second
Gulf war, the Internet has displaced it as the principal vehicle for disseminating the horror of international terrorism.
As a result of its low cost and global reach, the Internet allows any terrorist group to convey its ideological message
and demands, even to broadcast videos of executions and combat scenes, literally around the world.
The language employed in such dissemination plays an important role. On the one hand, Arabic is used to justify and
spread the ideology of Jihadism. On the other, English is used to spread terror and disseminate counter-information.
The battle for the control of information flows has led the US to invest 62 million dollars in setting up the Arabic
television channel al-Hurra (‘the free channel’) and the terrorist group al-Qaeda to counterattack by broadcasting
television  programmes such  as ‘The Voice  of  the Caliphate’ in  order  to  get  its vision  across to public opinion.
Therefore, while Jihadist terrorists have lost strength in the battle on the ground in Afghanistan, the creation of the
Global Islamic Media Front is transferring the battlelines to the Net.
Second, the Internet is becoming a recruitment and training tool for the terrorist cause. The proliferation of chat
rooms  is  attracting  the  attention  of  potential  young  terrorists  and  exercising  substantial  influence  on  their
indoctrination. The dissemination of training and combat videos, along with manuals for manufacturing explosives is
converting the Internet into an independent, distance-learning school  for  the recruitment and training of future
terrorists. Examples of this development can be seen in the document entitled, ‘How can I train myself for Jihad’,
which has circulated widely over the Internet, and in a video of the ‘Top 10’ battles of the international Jihad against
US forces.
Finally, the Internet has revolutionised the organisation of terrorist groups and their methods of planning attacks.
The nebulous and dispersed al-Qaeda adapts to the workings of the Internet by setting up small and anonymous
groups that  are  difficult  to  identify,  thus hindering the  antiterrorist  fight.  As for  planning,  access to  Internet
documents, images and information  on possible targets, together  with  the anonymity the Internet provides for
exchanging messages, facilitate the interconnection of terrorist groups across the planet.
The combination of these three factors has caused collateral  damage of various types to both Western and Arab
societies. The first is the Internet itself. Since 2001, the proliferation of laws regulating data control has eroded
individuals’ right to privacy in Western society. Furthermore, according to the Arab Human Development Report
2004,[4] Arab societies have been subjected to greater censorship with respect to Internet access, while freedom of
expression  has been  attacked. We are consequently  witnessing the proliferation  of  the storage of  data on  our
citizens in Western countries and spread institutions specialised in controlling Internet access in Arab countries,
particularly Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Syria.
The  multiplication  of  terrorist  groups  websites  is  also  sowing  confusion,  as  they  claim authorship  of  attacks
simultaneously or disseminate clashing guidelines. At the same time, within the international terrorism movement,
the al-Qaeda franchise acts as a centripetal  force that binds together many organisations, creating the image of
homogeneity and of a consensus within Jihadist terrorism. The inability of States to control the Internet is giving rise
to what we might call Internet militia or ‘patriots’ (such as the Internet Haganah Website [5]) who attempt to shut
down terrorist websites on their own initiative and wage their own personal information battles.
The question arises as to what extent terrorists have taken advantage of the possibilities that Internet has to offer.
If  the  purpose  of  propaganda  is to  create  an  environment  of  complicity  conducive  to  the  recruitment  of  new
members of the terrorist cause in the Arab world, it is reasonable to suppose that we are only in the initial stage.
Reports on Internet use underline that only 1.6% of worldwide users come from the Arab world. What is more, at
the end of 2002 only three Arab countries had an Internet use rate of over 10% and in 14 of the 22 Arab countries
less than 5% of the population enjoyed Internet access. Over 40% of Arab ‘internauts’ are concentrated in  six
countries  of  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  [6].  The  Arab  user  profile,  developed  by  the  International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), yields an average age of 30 years old, 70% with qualifications, 88% of whom
speak English, and 95% of whom are men.[7] To this should be added the high illiteracy rate in Arab countries,
which varies significantly from 13% in Bahrein to nearly 50% in Morocco. This data may perhaps downplay the
impact of the dissemination of terrorist ideology, but the asymmetry between the hub of terrorist dissemination and
its final repercussion may be due to behavioural differences. Whereas Western societies tend to prefer individual
Internet access, cybercafés appear to be more popular in Arab societies, and their impact and in terms of diffusion is
therefore multiplied. The continuous growth of Internet access in Arab countries raises unknown factors with respect
to future strategic landscapes in which new –and more representative– players will emerge on the Internet, leading
to changes in the current situation.
In the final analysis, we cannot rule out the possibility that terrorist use of the Internet and information technology
may develop in  such  a  way  as to cause  material  damage to society.  With  growing economic activity  between
increasingly  interconnected  groups,  the  network  provided by  the  technology  that  makes this  interconnectivity
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possible is becoming an ideal target for financial crime but also for terrorist groups. To put it simply, the more the
digital doors to society and the business world multiply, the more vulnerable modern society will become to digital
attacks. Although cyber-attacks on society in general are less dangerous than a traditional attack, they nevertheless
have an important psychological impact: they undermine faith in the stability of the system, thus imposing massive
costs. A significant cyberattack could entail of loss of billions of euros as the result of the financial system grinding to
a halt, as well as require the reconstruction of the system after the attack. If attacks of this kind become frequent,
citizens could easily lose confidence in financial  systems and investor incentives will  diminish, causing economic
damage above and beyond that of the cyberattack in itself. Not only financial systems are exposed to the risk of an
attack launched from cyberspace, but also our military systems and the aviation industry, to mention just a few, as
they depend more and more on information technology for their daily operations. The computer systems of all these
players are potential targets for any terrorist organisation seeking to inflict material damage on modern society.
Since the fabric of cyberspace is largely a ‘superstructure’ that does not depend on the frontiers that define our
nation-states,  the  strategic  risk  posed  by  cyberspace  is  by  definition  an  international  risk.  This  has  certain
implications for the design of the countermeasures necessary to reduce the threat and crack down on international
terrorist  activity.  In  order  for  them to  be  effective,  such  measures  will  require  a  high  level  of  international
cooperation and a coordinated strategy. Therefore, one of the principal challenges to be faced in combating the
ill-intentioned use of new technologies would be to manage an effort at the international level –and not simply at a
national or regional level–.
The Economy and Energy: Light and Darkness on the Strategic Horizon
The world’s strategic landscape has been relatively calm in recent years thanks mainly to the positive and stabilising
contribution of the international  economy. Although varied strategic challenges have arisen as this chapter  has
revealed, the smooth and vibrant pace of the world economy has made these challenges much more manageable
than they might have been. However, the support that the strategic landscape has received from the world economy
over the past three years is now grounded upon an increasingly unstable and possibly unsustainable foundation.
When the world economy begins to feel the strain of inevitable adjustments and corrections –not to mention the
effects of counterproductive or  destabilising political  reactions from certain  governments– many of the potential
strategic risks facing us –both conventional threats and the less traditional challenges analysed above– will grow
more significant.
In 2005 the world economy grew at a pace of 4.3% after recording a rate of 5.1% in 2004 –the highest global
economic growth in a generation– and 4% in 2003. It is generally agreed that the forecasts for 2006 point to a
growth rate of around 4.3%, making this the strongest four-year period of growth that the world economy has
witnessed in more than 30 years.[8] Furthermore, this growth has been synchronised in all parts of the world, and
in most areas the growth rates recorded over these past four years are significantly higher than the annual averages
of the past 20 years.
The most optimistic scenario would be for  the world economy to carry one with its dynamism in a sustainable
fashion. Some might think that this is the most likely scenario, but it is becoming increasingly possible that this
trend will not continue beyond the very short term. Apart from the new less conventional risks now emerging on the
strategic horizon, (Avian  flu  and other  pandemics, natural  disasters, climate change and sophisticated forms of
international terrorism abetted by the Internet) –any of which could easily exercise a destabilising influence on the
world economy– there are a number of other short-term risks that could stall world economic growth. These include,
above all: (1) an abrupt adjustment to the increasingly large macroeconomic imbalances straight-jacketing the world
economy; (2) a fresh outburst of protectionism and potentially even a trade war (possibly as a result of the ultimate
failure of  the  Doha Round, possibly  as a related consequence to continuing global  economic imbalances); and,
finally, (3) high and rising energy prices, a development which could inject ‘stagflationary’ (both recessionary and
inflationary) pressures into the world economy. Because the first of these two risks we have dealt with extensively
elsewhere, and because we believe that the upward trend in oil prices currently represents the most concrete threat
to continued rapid world economic growth, we will concentrate our attention here on that specific risk.[9]
The Threat of Higher Oil Prices
In January 2006 the price of oil soared above US$65 per barrel, not far below the then record level in nominal terms
(US$70 for West Texas Intermediate and US$67 for Brent).[10] The price has more than tripled in the four-plus
years since the beginning of January 2002. As for annual average prices, the average price level in 2005 more than
doubled that of 2002 (see Table 2).
Table 2. Oil Prices, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent, 1996-2005
Year WTI (US$/bbl) % Annual Growth Brent (US$/bbl) % Annual Growth
1996 22.12 – 20.67 –
1997 20.61 -6.8 19.09 -7.6
1998 14.42 -30.0 12.72 -33.4
1999 19.35 34.1 17.97 41.3
2000 30.38 57.0 28.50 58.6
2001 25.98 -14.5 24.44 -14.2
2002 26.18 0.8 25.02 2.4
2003 31.08 18.7 28.83 15.2
2004 41.51 33.6 38.27 32.7
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2005 56.37 35.8 55.00 43.7
Note: annual average daily prices; 2005 until 23 November.
Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2005 andEnergy Information Agency of the US, compiled by the authors.
In real terms, the average price of oil in 2005 moved closer to the highest level reached in contemporary history,
although it would have to rise by at least another 40% to equal this historical peak (see Graph 5).[11]
Graph 5. Oil Price Shocks, 1972-82, 1995-05
Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2005 and the Energy Information Agency of the US.
Although oil  prices began to show an upward trend in  1999 –after  bottoming out at approximately US$12 per
barrel– the continuous rise since 2002 has not impaired the recovery of global growth which, on the contrary, has
been gaining strength. The traditional  reference rule that each sustained hike of US$10 per  barrel  in oil  prices
slashes world economic growth by about 0.5% (and adds more or less half a percentage point to inflation) has not
applied to the recent evolution of the world economy (see Graph 6).
There are several reasons why the world economy has not yet suffered the effects of rising oil prices. First, the
world’s central  banks have achieved an  unprecedented level  of  credibility  over  the past  few decades and have
managed to keep world inflation at very low and stable levels for many years now (under 6% since 1997 and under
4% since 2002). As a result, the powerful inflationary expectations of private economic agents, originally generated
during the oil shocks of the 1970s (when world inflation soared dangerously into double-digits, 14.5% in 1974 and
17.2% in 1980) have been progressively eliminated. This change has given the world’s central banks a significant
margin of flexibility to maintain interest rates at historically low levels, despite increasingly high oil prices. Although
the central banks have now begun to raise interest rates again, (the Fed began in summer 2004 and the ECB in
December 2005), these rate hikes have been gentler and more gradual than during the second oil shock of 1979-80.
Graph 6. World Growth During the Three Oil Price Shocks, 1973-82 and 1999-2008
Note: the figures for 2006, 2007 and 2008 are projections Source: IMF.
Furthermore,  economies  have  also  improved  their  energy  efficiency  since  the  1970s.  The  world’s  advanced
economies use only half the oil they once did 30 years ago in order to generate a single unit of GDP. Meanwhile,
developing economies, still more energy intensive, have nevertheless cut their oil intensity by 30% over the same
period. This improvement in efficiency makes GDP growth that much less vulnerable to oil price hikes.
Finally, the oil price shocks of the 1970s (and the other two mini-shocks of 1990-92 and 1999-2000) were caused
by politically-triggered interruptions in the supply of crude oil, whereas the current shock is largely due to rising
demand (see Table 3), driven by substantial world economic growth. The implication of this is that when a rise in oil
prices is due to increased demand, the economy suffers less in terms of lost growth than when the rise is caused by
restrictions, whether political or natural/accidental, in supply.
Table 3. World Oil Demand, 1994-2005 [12]
Year
World Consumption
(mbd, Annual
Average)
Growth
(%, Annual) Growth(mbd, Annual Average)
World GDP
Growth (%)
1994 68.4 1.73 1.3 3.8
1995 69.5 1.46 1.1 3.6
1996 71.1 2.55 1.6 4.1
1997 73.2 2.56 2.1 4.2
1998 73.6 0.47 0.4 2.8
1999 75.1 1.82 1.5 3.7
2000 75.8 1.08 0.7 4.7
2001 76.4 0.50 0.6 2.4
2002 77.3 0.96 0.9 3.0
2003 78.7 1.86 1.4 4.0
2004 81.4 3.91 2.7 5.3
2005 82.5 1.01 1.1 4.9
Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2006 .
In any event, the impact of oil prices on the world economy will depend on what happens to oil prices from now on.
Everything indicates that if prices remain stable at their current level (US$60-US$65/bbl at the time of the original
publication in early 2006), the economic repercussions will be minimal particularly since the inflationary impact from
oil price increases has been very mild –at least so far–. The overall inflation rate for Europe was the same in 2005
(2.2%) as it was the previous year, whereas in the US the inflation rate for 2005 was 3.4% (compared to 3.3% in
2004). Inflation in China, the other major source of energy demand, also continues to be low. World inflation has
gone from 3.7% in 2003 to 3.9% in 2005, a much lower level than during the 1990s and a very modest increase in
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view of the unprecedented rise in oil prices and the powerful surge in world economic growth registered during the
same period.
This suggests that rises in  the price of oil  have not yet had broad-ranging second round effects upon prices in
general. Although a cascade of secondary effects on the general price level still seems to be inevitable, given the
transportation sector’s almost complete dependence on oil, such second round effects will remain limited as long as
the credibility of the world’s central banks remains intact –and oil prices do not continue to surge to unprecedented
levels–. Therefore, if oil prices remain stable at their current level, there is no reason for them to exert an additional
inflationary  impact  from  now  on.  This  would  mean  that  the  normalisation  that  interest  rates  are  currently
experiencing might not be so marked or abrupt, and that the expected economic deceleration will be moderate, with
world growth remaining in the region of 4%-4.5% in 2006 and 3.5%-4% in 2007.[13]
However, it seems that we are approaching a very delicate threshold for oil prices. It will be difficult to convincingly
maintain that oil prices could continue to rise substantially from now on without putting an end to the current period
of robust economic growth. If oil prices go beyond the US$70 per barrel barrier and soar as high as US$80 or more,
the inflationary impact could be considerable and the foreseeable reaction of the central  banks will  be to raise
interest rates more sharply, with the resulting negative impact on the world’s economic growth rate.
We therefore need to ask what will  happen to oil  prices in 2006 and 2007. Until  only recently, the outlook was
relatively bright. A milder winter, an at-least-temporary pause in the growth rate of petroleum demand, and an
increase in non-OPEC production were the three factors needed to create a scenario (A) in which prices would drop
to US$50 per barrel or, if OPEC proved incapable of cutting production to protect this level, even lower (scenario
A1). These scenarios would have had a very positive influence on inflation and world growth. At any rate, even
though scenarios A and A1 are still  feasible, several recent changes on the strategic landscape have made them
increasingly unlikely.
First, winter temperatures in the northern hemisphere have been somewhat lower than originally forecast back in
the fall of 2005, leading to a higher than expected consumption of oil products. Second, OPEC already –although not
intentionally–  experienced a reduction in  its production levels at  the end of  2005 owing both to the continual
interruptions to Iraq’s production, and to other factors that affected other OPEC member states. The social unrest in
Nigeria’s Delta region, for example, has diminished the country’s production by nearly 100,000 barrels a day and it
is possible that the oil workers’ unions may have to withdraw from the production areas for security reasons. This is
threatening to lower Nigeria’s output much more significantly, pointing to the likelihood that the expected increase
in non-OPEC production for 2006 will be undermined by unforeseen restrictions within OPEC itself. In addition, the
Iranian nuclear crisis continues to destabilise the oil markets, pushing up January 2006 prices to a level (US$65 per
barrel) at least US$10 higher than the average for 2005. Unless the Nigerian and Iranian situations are resolved
soon, the more favourable scenarios (A and A1) are unlikely to unfold (see Table 4).
The most favourable situation at the present would seem to be a scenario (B) in which the average price remains at
some US$60 to US$65 per barrel throughout 2006. While there have been very wide discrepancies in the estimates
for  world oil  demand in  2006, and for  the expected increase in non-OPEC production, should conditions remain
stable, particularly in Nigeria and Iran, the most likely variations in demand (an increase of between 1.3 mbd and
1.86 mbd in 2006) and in non-OPEC supply (an increase of between 1 mbd and 1.4 mbd) would put the range of
possible average prices at between US$55 and US$65 per barrel for 2006 (eg, Scenario B).
However, if the situation in Nigeria worsens, OPEC countries –chiefly Saudi Arabia– could put some of their idle
capacity into production so as to mitigate the Nigerian impact on world prices. This scenario (B1) would be somewhat
worse than the previous one (B), with prices remaining at between US$65 and US$70 per barrel  until  Nigerian
production returned to normal levels. But if Iranian oil exports were to drop significantly (for example, as the result
of the Western countries placing economic sanctions on Iran) even as Nigerian output remains depressed –or even
drops more substantially– or should all of Iran’s 2.5 mbd of oil exports be cut off (as a result of an embargo placed
by Iran itself on Western countries, irrespective of what is occurring in Nigeria), we would be dealing with another
much more negative scenario (C). In scenario C, the OPEC could not compensate for all the lost oil output. Prices
would break through the technical  and psychological  barrier  of US$70 per barrel  and would approach US$80 or
US$85 per barrel, bringing the average price for 2006 up to around US$70-75 dollars per barrel.
Scenario C would imply a potentially lethal price shock to the world economy. A new sustained rise over US$70 per
barrel would probably put an end to the period of substantial world economic growth and could possibly even spark a
dollar  crisis (as the  global  macroeconomic imbalances,  alluded to previously,  begin  to abruptly  unwind) and a
dangerous resurgence of protectionism. Scenario C is the gloomiest from the perspective of possible developments in
oil prices and their potential impact on the world economy in 2006. This scenario, triggered by mounting tension
over the current Iranian nuclear crisis, would undermine the cushioning impact that strong world growth has been
exercising upon the strategic landscape and would, as a result, accentuate all the risks emerging on the strategic
horizon that have been analysed earlier in this paper.
Table 4. Oil Price Scenarios for 2006 [14]
Potential
Scenarios
Demand
Increase(2005/06)
Non-OPEC
Supply
Increase(2005/06)
OPEC Nigeria:
Export
Level
Iran:
Export
Level
Brent
Price
(US$)
Economic
Impact
(2004:
5.3%
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2005:
4.9%)
A
(optimistic)
1.2mbd 1.5-2.0mbd Effective
at cutting
production
Status
quo
Status
quo
50 Positive
4%-4.5%
A1 1.2mbd 1.5-2.0mbd Ineffective
at cutting
production
Status
quo
Status
quo
40-45 The ‘best
case’
scenario
4.5%+
B
(status quo)
1.6mbd 1.2mbd status quo Status
quo
Status
quo
60-65 Benign
3.5%-4%
B1 1.6mbd 1.2mbd Effective
(sufficient
idle
capacity)
Worsens Status
quo
65-75 Moderate
deceleration
3%-3.5%
C
(pessimistic)
1.6mbd 1.2mbd Not
effective
(insufficient
idle
capacity)
WorsensSignificant
drop
75-85 Significant
deceleration
2%-3.0%
Source: Elcano Royal Institute
Energy Dependence and Spanish Interests
Spain’s energy dependence poses strategic risks that are no less acute or challenging than those faced by the other
advanced countries. Spain’s demand for  the two principal  hydrocarbons –oil  and gas– has grown enormously in
recent years. Since 2965, oil consumption in Spain has increased by an annual average of 4.5%, a considerably
faster pace than the world rate (2.5%). This differential is fairly similar for the period since 1980 (1.75% in Spain
compared with 1.2% in the rest of the world). However, in the past 10 years, the gap between Spain and the rest of
the world has widened even further, with an average annual growth of 3.5% in Spain compared to global growth of
only 1.8%. The same phenomenon can be seen in Spain’s growing demand for gas. Over the past 10 years, Spain’s
consumption of natural gas has increased at an average annual rate of 15%. Since 1993, gas consumption in Spain
has increased by nearly 275% and now accounts for over 16% of the primary energy mix (more than any other
traditional energy source except oil, which now accounts for 53%).
Today, oil  and gas together account for 70% of the primary energy consumed in Spain (compared with 62% in
1990), much higher than the European average (64%) and an indicator that Spain is even more dependent on the
principal hydrocarbons than other advanced countries (65% in the US, 64% in the OECD and 61% in the world).
In 2004 Spain consumed primary energy –including oil and derivatives (53%), natural gas (16.9%), coal (14.5%),
nuclear energy (9.8%) and hydroelectric energy (5.4%)– equivalent to nearly 3 million barrels of oil  daily, just
under 1.5% of the total amount consumed in the world (over 205 million barrels of oil equivalent per day). It is a
reasonable bet that unless Spain’s energy policy and consumption patterns change, the national demand for energy
will continue to grow at a faster rate than the world average. The energy issue is therefore of paramount importance
to the continued smooth running of the Spanish economy.
Graph 7. Primary Energy Consumption in Spain, 1990-2004
Note: mbep/d = oil equivalent, millions of barrels per day.
Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2005.
Imports, Geographical Dependence and Potential Geopolitical Risks
Spain largely depends on imported energy, particularly for the principal hydrocarbons. Its oil and gas reserves are so
small  as to be merely  testimonial. Its current  annual  production  of  oil  and gas,  limited to a handful  of  minor
production sites, covers less than 0.4% and 0.9%, respectively, of annual domestic consumption. Of the nearly 1.6
million barrels of oil consumed daily in 2004, over 99.6% were imported. Over 99% of the gas consumed in Spain
that same year (an amount equivalent to 0.5 million barrels of oil per day) was also imported.
Spain currently depends on a small  number of countries for  its energy imports: chiefly Russia, Algeria, Nigeria,
Libya, Saudi Arabia and Mexico, the six suppliers with at least a 5% share in the Spanish energy market (see Table
5). More than 54% of all Spain’s energy imports comes from these six countries, and Russia and Nigeria have upped
their market shares by nearly 75% over the past four years.
Table 5. Energy Imports, Spain, January-October 2005
Position Country Imports (€ billion) %
1 Russia 3,365 12.87
2 Algeria 2,918 11.16
3 Nigeria 2,321 8.87
4 Libya 1,842 7.04
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5 Saudi Arabia 1,591 6.09
6 Mexico 1,583 6.05
7 Italy 1,248 4.77
8 Iran 1,206 4.61
9 Norway 1,069 4.09
10 Iraq 824 3.15
 Subtotal 17,971 68.71
 Total 26,154 100
Note: data taken from chapter 27 of Spain’s customs tariff. Includes coal, hydrocarbons and electricity.
Source: Mercados Emergentes, based on data from Estacon.
From Russia, Saudi Arabia and Mexico, Spain imports oil almost exclusively. From Nigeria and Libya it imports oil but
also sizeable quantities of gas. Around 65% of all Spanish oil imports come from these five countries.
Table 6. Oil Imports, Spain, Percentage of Total, 2002-05
Position Country 2002 (%) 2003 (%) 2004 (%) 2005 (%)
1 Mexico 13.8 12.7 13.4 15.1
2 Russia 14.1 17.2 14.7 14.4
3 Nigeria 9.4 11.1 10.9 12.0
4 Saudi Arabia 12.0 12.2 11.6 10.6
5 Libya 11.5 13.3 12.3 10.4
6 Iran 5.8 7.4 6.4 8.3
7 Norway 3.9 5.4 6.2 5.0
8 Iraq 4.2 2.7 7.7 4.9
9 Algeria 1.9 2.6 3.1 3.5
 Subtotal 76.6 84.6 86.3 84.2
            
 Other countries 23.4 15.4 13.7 15.8
Source: Boletín Estadístico de Hidrocarburos, Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio, December and January 2005; Anuario Estadístico de España 2005, Instituto Nacional de
Estadística.
Furthermore, gas imported from Algeria –nearly half of which reaches Spain via the Maghreb-Europe Gas pipeline
(MEG or Pedro Durán Farell) passing through Morocco– accounts for nearly 50% of Spain’s consumption.[15] Nigeria
(15%), Qatar  (14%), Egypt  (8.5%), Norway (6.5%) and Libya (2.7%) are  also important  sources of  liquefied
natural gas (LNG).
Table 7. Natural Gas Imports, Spain, 2002-05
Position Country 2002 (%) 2003 (%) 2004 (%) 2005 (%)
1 Algeria 58.5 57.4 49.8 43.3
2 Nigeria 7.6 16.9 18.0 15.6
3 Qatar 10.0 8.2 14.1 13.9
4 Egypt – – 0.3 10.1
5 Norway 10.8 10.0 8.0 6.3
6 Oman 5.1 2.4 5.0 5.1
7 Libya 2.9 3.1 2.5 2.7
8 Trinidad and Tobago 2.2 0.1 – 1.2
9 Malaysia – – 0.9 0.8
10 United Arab Emirates 1.0 1.6 1.4 0.7
 Subtotal 98.1 99.7 100 99.7
Other countries 1.9 0.3 0 0.2
Source: Boletín Estadístico de Hidrocarburos, Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio, December and January 2005; Anuario Estadístico de España 2005, Instituto Nacional de
Estadística.
It can generally be said that Spain’s sources of petroleum are fairly diversified. Furthermore, the fact that the
international oil market is a fungible market with alternative sources affords Spain a certain amount of stability, as
it  reduces the  risk  of  a  hypothetical  disruption  of  supply  from a particular  country.  Even  so,  Spain  is heavily
dependent on oil which accounts for over 50% of its primary energy use (compared to only 40% in the US and in
the world in general) while over 99.6% is imported. Given that the oil market is fungible and international, Spain
continues to be particularly sensitive to price shocks in a market whose prices are highly volatile owing to scant
current spare capacity (less than 3% of world consumption).
Spain also imports over half of its oil from only six OPEC countries (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq and
Algeria) which are neither consolidated democracies nor stable or predictable regimes. A further 11% comes from
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African countries with similar characteristics. European partners (such as the United Kingdom and Norway) account
for barely 5% of Spanish petroleum imports and are unable to increase this proportion much more on account of
their limited output. Mexico continues to be an important partner (the second largest supplier during the 2002-2005
period and the leading Spanish source in 2005), but lacks the potential to boost its production easily. This leaves
Russia, Spain’s most important oil supplier in recent years, though Russia neither has the capacity to increase its
exports in the short term nor is it the most reliable regime in terms of energy supply, as witnessed during the recent
crisis with the Ukraine and the general ‘nationalistic’ drift of Russian energy policy over the past years. All things
considered, the fact that over 75% of all Spanish oil imports (equivalent to 40% of its primary energy consumption)
comes from non-democratic or unstable regimes (ie, those of the Middle East, Africa and Russia) rapidly leads us to
the conclusion that the Spanish economy does indeed face a high level of energy-related geopolitical risk.
Furthermore, although Spain is quite advanced in its use of liquefied natural  gas –making its gas imports more
flexible– nearly 60% of all imported gas (over 10% of primary energy consumed) comes from three North African
countries (Algeria, Egypt and Libya, and nearly half from Algeria alone). Much of this gas reaches Spain via the MEG
gas pipeline that runs through another  Maghreb country, Morocco, and will  continue to do so until  the Medgaz
pipeline, a joint project of CEPSA and Sonatrach that will link Beni Saf in Algeria directly with Almería in southern
Spain, comes into service in 2008-09. But even once this direct pipeline is up and running, Spain will continue to
depend on Algeria and to a lesser extent on Libya for  its natural  gas supply. As gas continues progressively to
account  for  a  larger  proportion  of  energy  consumption,  this  dependence  will  further  underline  how important
stability in the Maghreb –and North Africa in general– is to Spain’s fundamental interests.[16]
Therefore, what happens in the Persian Gulf and in North and West Africa is of paramount importance to Spain as it
depends on  these  three  regions for  40% of  its primary  energy  consumption. More  than  most  of  its European
partners and transatlantic allies (ie, Canada and the US), Spain has a fundamental  interest in the stability and
development of the Arab and Islamic worlds and in the maintenance of good relations with these countries.
Diversification and Energy Policy
In the end, unless the Spanish economy’s energy base experiences a significant transformation, Spain will become
increasingly dependent on oil  imports from the Middle East, particularly the Persian Gulf –as will  all  the world’s
major oil importers–. This likely trend in the pattern of Spain’s energy dependence suggests that diversifying the
country’s primary energy mix and reducing the economy’s dependence on oil and petroleum derivatives ought to be
a policy priority. Although gas may still  come to account for a larger  share of the primary energy mix, Spain’s
significant  dependence  on  the  Maghreb region  points to  the  wisdom of  making a  greater  effort  to  encourage
alternatives other than hydrocarbons.
For the time being, there is some margin for expanding renewable energy sources (eg, wind and solar) –a sector in
which  a  number  of  Spanish  companies figure  among the  world’s leaders–  and even  nuclear  energy  (should it
ultimately prove to be politically and economically viable). Even so, these alternatives are only capable of serving as
short- or medium-term substitutes for gas and coal in electricity production, but not as alternatives to the basic use
of oil in transport and agriculture. Although they would help Spain meet its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol (an
area in which Spain is currently one of the poorest performers in Europe), they would have only a minimal impact
on  the  country’s  great  vulnerability  to  oil  price  fluctuations  on  the  international  market  and  to  potential
interruptions in the supply of hydrocarbons from the less-than-stable countries mentioned above.
In this connection, it should be a priority for Spain and for Europe to design and implement a strategy to diversify
energy sources, reduce the intensity of oil use and generally boost efficiency. In the medium and long term –that is
over the next two decades– other non-traditional sources will need to be sought to replace oil, in particular, and to
be incorporated into the economy’s energy base in  an economically rational  and non-traumatic fashion. In this
regard,  the  December  2006  publication  of  the  Strategic  Review  of  European  Energy  Policy  (currently  being
conducted by the European Commission), along with the subsequent debate on energy during the run-up to the
Spring Council next year will be of great interest to Spain.
Dilemmas of the Medium- and Long-Term Energy Outlook
Although the scope of this chapter does not allow us to analyse in depth the various long-term energy scenarios, we
do believe it is essential to briefly consider the longer-term energy outlook in order to underline the fact that the
energy issue has strategic implications beyond the price scenarios for  2006 or  2007. The economic and energy
scenarios may seem complicated in the short term, but unprecedented dilemmas and challenges are emerging on the
longer-term horizon. The outlook for the longer term points to a shift to a post-hydrocarbon energy economy as one
of the most important human challenges in the history of mankind.
Medium-term Geopolitical Challenges
The concentration of oil and gas reserves in the Middle East and former USSR (72% of world oil and gas reserves)
implies greater geopolitical competition in the medium term between consumer countries (eg, the US, Europe and
East Asia) to secure sufficient supplies of hydrocarbons from the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia (particularly
Siberia and the Russian Far  East). This trend is sharpening as the result  of the galloping demand of the large
emerging economies like China and India, which are becoming increasingly dependent on oil and gas imports.
Other factors are complicating the situation further. For example, none of the countries belonging to this ‘great
energy crescent’ (Middle East  + Central  Asia + Russia/Siberia) is a consolidated democracy; indeed, many are
de-facto autocracies and some are, for all practical purposes, failed states. Furthermore, nearly all the reserves and
hydrocarbon  production  of  this ‘energy  crescent’  are  in  the  hands of  state  companies (the  so-called NOCs, or
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‘national oil companies’), a factor that serves as an obstacle to the investment plans of private companies (so-called
IOCs, or ‘international oil companies’) from Europe and the US, which are being forced to operate with dwindling
reserves and in  increasingly marginal  (and more dangerous and costly) areas of  the world (such as Africa, for
example). Furthermore, the new Asian consumer countries –particularly China and India– also have energy sectors
dominated by state companies, now emerging as the natural collaborators of the NOCs of the producer countries of
the ‘Great Crescent’.
Over the past years, China has signed ‘strategic agreements’ –centred on energy cooperation– with Russia, Saudi
Arabia and India, among others. Meanwhile, China’s state-run companies have entered into their own agreements,
particularly  with  other  NOCs,  to  develop  oil  and gas  production  in  a  number  of  countries,  including  Canada,
Venezuela, Sudan, Nigeria, Angola and Syria. Such developments not only pose huge challenges to Western energy
companies  but  also  increase  the  possibility  that  both  the  producer  countries  of  the  ‘Great  Crescent’  and the
consumer  countries of  Asia will  make energy issues central  to their  foreign policy, wielding energy security  as
geopolitical weapon and establishing it as a chief foreign policy objective and guideline.
To this should be added the fact that the advanced OECD countries do not have a common energy policy. Nor do
they individually have formal coherent national energy policies. Unless this situation changes, the energy security of
the advanced economies will be increasingly under threat. Irrespective of whether or not an effective energy policy
is designed, heightened competition for the energy resources of the countries of the ‘Great Crescent’ will increase
geopolitical tensions and raise the risk of military conflict.
Four Long-term Scenarios: Poverty, Climate Change, War and Transformation
According to the projections of the International Energy Agency, world demand for energy in general  and oil  in
particular will be at least 50% higher in 2030 than currently. Unless radical changes take place in the energy base
of the world economy, a further 40 to 50 million barrels per day (mbd) will be consumed (and produced) in addition
to the 84 mbd currently consumed –amounting to an increase of between 50% and 60%– not to mention the need
to boost the production of other primary energy sources to meet world demand. This prospect gives rise to a three-
headed dilemma that is threatening to deteriorate into a vicious circle.
(1) Poverty, World Growth and Energy
In order to significantly reduce poverty (in which live half of the population of the non-OECD countries), the world
economy would have to grow even more quickly than currently (for example, at a rate of six or seven% instead of
only 3% to 4%) and maintain this more rapid pace for decades. Such a benevolent scenario –likely or not– would
lead to an increased demand for energy that would severely challenge the world hydrocarbons industry and put to a
test its exploration, production, transportation and refining capacity. Simply to meet the demand projected from now
until 2030 as a result of a much more modest growth rate of 3.5% annually (somewhat lower than the current rate,
and the figure forecast by the IMF), world energy production would need to increase by at least 50%. Who will
supply  this volume of  oil?  Who will  influence  and control  this hypothetical  rise  in  production?  Where  will  the
necessary investment resources come from? Is it possible and at what price?
To achieve such production levels by 2030 would require an investment of some US$17 trillion, according to the
estimates of the IEA. Such an investment is equivalent to some US$680 billion per year for 25 years –that is, an
economic investment in energy roughly equivalent to Brazil’s current GDP each year–. This challenge will test not
only our physical resources (particularly given that world oil production may well reach its peak before 2030 and at
a level below 125 mbd) but also our technical, business and political capacities. Nevertheless, if we do not achieve
such production increases, world poverty will  increasingly become a strategic risk for everyone given its negative
impact  on  local  ecosystems,  mass  migration  towards  advanced  countries  and  possibly  international  political
instability (to say nothing of the ethical implications of allowing a significant portion of the world’s people to continue
to live in poverty). If the current situation is politically and socially unsustainable (and the mere existence of the
UN’s Millennium Goals suggests that this is the case), the situation in 25 years into the future will  be even less
sustainable –if political and military conflicts with almost unconceivable consequences have not already occurred–.
(2) Climate Change
But even should we manage to produce enough hydrocarbons to continue to grow on a world-scale at a sufficiently
rapid  rate  to  begin  to  sustainably  reduce  global  poverty,  it  is  very  likely  that  such  increased  hydrocarbon
consumption (at least 50% greater than current levels) –and the concomitant greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions– will
provoke a climate change much more destabilising than the continuity or worsening of world poverty. Without much
more effective international cooperation in reducing carbon dioxide emissions than has been achieved to date, it is
more than likely that global warming will trigger explosive social and political tensions following widespread coastal
flooding,  desertification  in  many  areas  and  radical  cooling  in  others,  chaotic  mass  migrations  and  worldwide
economic turmoil. The maintenance of peace, on the one hand, and the survival of democracy, on the other, could
become not so much a distant dream as a nearly childish fantasy.
(3) Resource Wars
However, even if the most harmful effects of climate change do not materialise (as only a small minority of qualified
scientists predict) continued growth in hydrocarbon consumption, consistent with current levels of economic growth,
would lead to still  another  scenario with  an  equally  disastrous result. As mentioned previously,  there exists a
growing body  of  evidence  that  many  consumer  countries,  particularly  but  not  exclusively  the  great  emerging
countries like China and India, are developing strategies to ensure sufficient supply and transport of hydrocarbons in
order to feed their projected future growth. Sooner or later this trend, which shows no signs of subsiding, could
easily give rise to increasingly tense military rivalry, as evidenced by the latest developments in Chinese naval
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strategy or even the recent evolution of US foreign policy. The spectre of a ‘resource wars’ cannot be excluded from
the range of credible possibilities.
(4) The Challenge of Transformation
If we do not give serious consideration to these global challenges –and to the possible ways of preventing these
three different potentials paths from leading us nevertheless to the same destination– but by some miraculous
stroke of luck manage to avoid their worst outcomes, we will still have to face the Gordian knot that underlies this
triple dilemma. Over the next 25 years the world economy will need to increase oil output by at least twice as much
as it did during the past 25 years (ie, augment current world petroleum output by another 40-50mbd compared to
mere 22mbd barrels of extra output that the world’ oil industry has added to supply since 1980). And this will have
to be achieved in the face of great uncertainty regarding our ability to do so in technical, economic and political
terms. Simply  put,  even  in  the  best  case  scenario,  this would require  an  historically  unprecedented technical,
financial and political effort.
Therefore, in order to have even a chance of overcoming the first negative scenario described above –continuation
of world poverty– oil production would have to be increased at a pace hitherto never witnessed. However, to avoid
the second scenario –politically destabilising climate change detonated by our carbon dioxide emissions– not only
would a significant increase in energy production in the short and medium term be required but also a revolutionary
transformation of our energy system that would allow for continue growth in energy consumption without a parallel
increase in the emission of greenhouse gases. Finally, in order to disable the third scenario –military conflict brought
on by competing national geopolitical machinations aimed at controlling economically essential energy resources–
not only would an unprecedented increase in energy production and a transformation in our energy economy be
required, but also more effective international cooperation diplomacy than has ever been achieved in the past so as
to effectively manage the distribution of world energy resources while warding off military conflicts.
Conclusion
Although some of the risks addressed in this paper (for example, avian flu or oil  prices) might possibly play an
important  role on the short-term strategic horizon, the effects of  others (increase in  natural  disasters, climate
change, new pandemics, political instability and military competition) would largely be felt over the medium and long
term.  Between  now and 2030,  both  Spain  and Europe  –like  the  US,  China  and the  rest  of  the  international
community– will have to consider the possible combinations, alternative trends and likely impacts that these risks
may unleash upon our strategic landscape. We would be well-served to begin the task now, while the still robust
pace of economic growth allows us to and while there is still enough time to act in an anticipatory fashion.
In the short term, our potential risks come from all corners of the planet, and indeed from the international system
itself (ie, the spread of bird flu and the impact of higher oil prices). However, in the long term, two regions appear to
be central to the future of Spain and Europe: (2) the Arab-Islamic belt (Maghreb + Middle East + Central Asia) and
Africa. The economic pressure and political  instability that can spread to Spain from these areas through mass
immigration (driven by poverty and climate change) and volatility in  energy prices and supply (due to political
instability or even ‘wars over resources’) are the most direct long-term strategic risks.
In conclusion, Spanish policy (appropriately articulated within the context of EU policy) should concentrate on the
following long-term tasks in  order  to  mitigate  the  possible  negative  impacts of  these  risks:  (1)  the  design  of
emergency plans for reacting to new pandemics and for combating the effects of natural and man-made disasters;
(2) the articulation of an energy policy aimed at diversifying Spain’s primary energy mix beyond hydrocarbons; and
(3) the execution of a foreign policy capable of facilitating the democratisation and economic development of both
Africa and the Arab-Islamic world.
Paul Isbell
Senior Analyst, International Economy and Trade, Elcano Royal Institute
Rickard Sandell
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escenarios,  nuevos desafios:  la  transformación  del  horizonte  estratégico’)  in  the  Spanish  Ministry  of  Defence’s
annual publication, El panorama estratégico 2005-06. In this new edition, the authors have in some cases modified
or updated certain materials directly within the text, while in other cases the necessary updates and changes have
been analysed in footnotes to the original text.
[2]There have been several previous waves of globalisation throughout the history of mankind. The most recent is
characterised, among other things, by mass global tourism and a very significant reduction in travel times.
[3]The authors are grateful to Natalia Sancha García for the information and first draft of this section.
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[8] Since the original publication of this paper earlier this year, the world energy scenario has changed somewhat.
In the year to date, oil prices have average nearly US$70/bbl, some US$20/bbl higher than assumed in our original
baseline reference case, Scenario A, elaborated below. These higher prices correspond to Scenarios B or B1, in which
world economic growth for 2006 would be no higher than 4% (and possibly as low as 3%). Given that we are well
into the second half of the year, and that growth estimates have been adjusted downward in a number of countries,
particularly in the US, even if they have been readjusted upward in other  parts of the world, the more modest
outlook  of  Scenario  B might  be more reasonable  than  Scenario  A.   Nevertheless,  the IMF  has just  published
(September 2006) its revised forecasts for 2006 and 2007 to 5.1% and 4.9%, respectively, up from 4.8% and 4.7%
in April. Even the closed data from 2005 has been revised upward to 4.9% from 4.3%. All of this following a year in
which average oil prices rose by 50%, and during a year in which they rose again nearly another third, at least to
date. These developments suggest that perhaps the effects we predicted from such prices for 2006 will be delayed –
but still unfold nonetheless—in 2007, or that the economy is proving far less sensitive to oil prices than anyone has
ever imagined before. Our own call remains the former, as opposed to the latter.
[9] See, for example, Paul Isbell, ‘Years of Living Dangerously: From the Twin Deficits to the Balance of Financial
Terror?’, Working Paper 28/2005, Elcano Royal Institute, 1/VI/2005.
[10] The price of oil has since reached US$77-US$78/bbl on a couple of occasions (most recently in August 2006),
although for a number of weeks up to the time of this republication international oil prices moved within the US$70-
US$75/bbl range.
[11] However, since the time of the original publication of this paper in early 2006, oil prices have by and large
remained higher than US$70/bbl, much closer to the all-time high in real terms (US$82/bbl in 1980).
[12] This table has been modified since the original publication to reflect the new data and changes to data for
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previous years now included in British Petroleum’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2006.
[13] The reader should nevertheless keep in mind that since the time of the original publication of this paper in
early  2006, oil  prices have risen to over  US$70/bbl, hitting a peak around US$78/bbl  and settling in  a range
between US$70/bbl and US$75/bbl during the weeks leading up to this re-edition (although they have fallen to as
low as US$62/bbl since). Prices have nevertheless averaged this year some US$10/bbl higher than assumed in the
paragraphs above, and more than US$20/bbl higher than in our baseline Scenario A, in which world growth would
come in at 4%-4.5% in 2006. Given these higher prices for 2006 (US$70/bbl on average), we would expect world
growth to be no more than 4% in 2006 and as low as 3% in 2007.
[14] At the time of this re-publication, in early September 2006, some eight to nine months after the drafting of the
original text, Scenario B1 seems to have taken hold of oil prices, now hovering at around US$70/bbl, after having
peaked again in August at nearly US$80/bbl. While the demand growth for 2006 now appears to be well below the
assumptions of this scenario (0.9mbd instead of the originally expected 1.6mbd), increases in non-OPEC supply also
seem to be on track to come in far below original expectations (0.6/0.7mbd instead of 1.2mbd). While such changes
might be expected to give oil prices at least some respite, the Nigerian context has deteriorated significantly since
the beginning of the year (0.5mbd lost to disturbances in the Delta versus only 0.1mbd lost as of January 2006) and
the Iranian situation –although no oil exports have yet been cut off– has not been resolved and is indeed on the
brink  of  provoking the  imposition  of  sanctions  (if  not  outright  military  intervention).  As  a  result,  speculative
pressures, riding on a perception of a justified and significant ‘geopolitical premium’ have kept oil prices at or above
US$70/bbl (ie, the equivalent of Scenario B1 outlined above). What is more, the risk is clearly on the downside, with
a movement into Scenario C far more likely than a shift back to scenario A. Of course, any rebate of the various
geopolitical pressures could allow for prices to fall toward US$60/bbl, allowing world economic growth to continue
apace.
[15] As a result, nearly 20% of all gas consumed in Spain comes from Algeria on the MEG pipeline via Morocco.
[16]  In 2005, Spain was the world’s third-largest importer of liquefied natural gas, consuming nearly 22 bcm a year
(compared with Japan’s 76 bcm, South Korea’s 30 bcm, the US’s 18 bcm and France’s nearly 13 bcm). On the other
hand, less than 12 bcm of the gas consumed annually in Spain arrives via land-based gas pipelines.
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